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1 Introduction
The extant literature contains a number of strong claims on the relative properties of different
pharmaceutical reimbursement mechanisms, and especially on the merits of reference pricing as
compared to fixed percentage reimbursement schemes. In this paper, we show that some of those
claims are driven by specific modelling assumptions and would, at least, be mitigated under more
general assumptions.
In a large number of countries, individuals only pay a fraction of the price of the prescription
pharmaceuticals they consume, whilst the government or other third-party payers are responsible
for the remainder. Two widely adopted mechanisms to determine the relative contribution of the
patient and the government are fixed percentage reimbursement (FPR) and reference pricing (RP).
Under FPR, the government pays a fixed percentage of the pharmaceutical’s price and the patient
is responsible for the remainder. Thus, the patient’s payment corresponds to a fixed percentage
of the price, also known as the copayment rate. By contrast, under RP, within each cluster of
pharmaceuticals1, one is chosen as the ‘reference’for the determination of the government’s con-
tribution: the government only pays a fixed fraction of the ‘reference’pharmaceutical’s price, even
if the consumer actually buys a more expensive alternative. Naturally, RP is only viable if more
than one pharmaceutical is available for the treatment of the same condition and is especially used
when low-price generic competition exists.2
Reference pricing has attracted a lot of attention in the literature and a large consensus has
emerged regarding its merits. For instance, Brekke et al. (2007) show that RP leads to lower prices
than FPR mechanisms. They further show that the two mechanisms are equivalent from a social
welfare perspective but RP is superior if, adopting a public payer’s perspective, the producers’
profits are excluded from the analysis. Merino-Castelló (2003) also shows that RP enhances price
competition and leads to significant reductions in the price of branded pharmaceuticals. On a
cautionary note, whilst also acknowledging the potential benefits of this mechanism, Miraldo (2009)
notes that if firms anticipate the introduction of RP, they will optimally revise their prices upwards
ahead of that introduction, thus significantly limiting its expected effectiveness. Nevertheless,
Brekke et al. (2009) and Brekke et al. (2011) present empirical evidence of significant price
reductions for all pharmaceuticals following the introduction of RP in Norway.
Most of the models in the literature on reference pricing, namely Brekke et al. (2007), Brekke
et al. (2011), Merino-Castelló (2003) and Miraldo (2009), are based on a Hotelling framework:
firms sell differentiated versions of a pharmaceutical, with differentiation being represented by their
position along a Hotelling interval, and compete by (simultaneously) setting prices; consumers are
uniformly distributed along that interval and their position represents their preferences towards
1Several criteria could be used to cluster pharmaceuticals: chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic (Miraldo,
2009).
2For a detailed review of reference pricing, see López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000).
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the potential varieties of the product; any mismatch between the locations of firms and consumers
generates a utility loss to the latter, often described as a ‘transportation cost’, which is added to
the price of the pharmaceutical; each consumer buys one unit of the pharmaceutical if total cost -
price plus transportation cost - does not exceed his reservation price. Authors commonly assume
this restriction to be fulfilled thus implying that every consumer buys one unit of the product. In
this type of setting, it is not surprising that social welfare is equal across reimbursement regimes
(e.g. as in Brekke et al., 2007), as there are no quantity effects. Reimbursement regimes merely
determine who captures the surplus created but not its amount.
This paper’s main purpose is to analyze the impact of reimbursement mechanisms such as FPR
and RP in a setting where each consumer’s demand depends on prices. This strikes us as a realistic
assumption, at least for some health conditions. Consider, for instance, conditions that result in
recurring episodes of symptoms of variable intensity, such as sleeping disorders, muscular pain or
migraines. It is entirely plausible that the patient will react to the price of the pharmaceutical he
has been prescribed when deciding whether to take it on a specific occasion. Thus, over time, the
quantity he buys may be inversely related to price. On the other hand, our setting may be less
adequate for pharmaceuticals that are used to treat serious non-recurring conditions, in which case
the patient will often be limited to the choice of following his physician’s prescription, and buying
the pharmaceutical, or not buying it at all. In this case, the standard Hotelling framework used by
Brekke et al. (2007) seems more fitting.
We obtain two novel results. First, we find that, under RP, prices are increasing in the share
of the pharmaceutical’s price borne by the consumer, converging to FPR prices as that copayment
rate approaches one. This contrasts, for instance, with Brekke et al. (2007) or Gonçalves et al.
(2011), who find that, under RP, prices are independent of the copayment rate. Second, we show
that, for suffi ciently high copayment rates, social welfare under RP is lower than under FPR, a
result which runs contrary to the previous literature boasting the merits of RP.
The differences with respect to previous literature’s results are mainly determined by the impact
of the elastic demand assumption on the properties of RP mechanisms, as our results for FPR are
in line with the previous literature. In a nutshell, whereas under FPR an increase in the copayment
rate has no impact on the relative prices faced by the consumer, as all prices rise by the same
percentage, under RP this is not so: an increase in the copayment rate changes the relative prices
faced by the consumer in favor of the more expensive pharmaceuticals. Ceteris paribus, this would
increase their market share but their producers take the opportunity to raise their prices. Prices
being strategic complements, other firms respond by also raising prices. Thus, in equilibrium,
higher copayment rates lead to higher prices, explaining our first result. Under FPR, social welfare
does not depend on the copayment rate: firms’‘mark-up’their prices (and profits) in an inversely
proportional manner with respect to the copayment rate such that the amount the consumer has to
pay does not change (and, thus, consumer surplus does not depend on the copayment rate). Under
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RP, however, higher copayment rates lead to higher prices and lower consumption levels and, thus,
to a fall in consumer surplus that is only partially compensated by the increase in profits (net of
government expenditure). For suffi ciently high copayments rates, this brings social welfare under
RP below what it would be with FPR, hence explaining the second result.
From a policy viewpoint, two conclusions emerge: firstly, from a consumer’s perspective, price
differences across reimbursement mechanisms are likely to be lower when copayment rates are rel-
atively high. In such a scenario, the introduction of RP is unlikely to result in significant price
reductions (and, thus, significant government expenditure savings) compared to FPR. Secondly,
when copayment rates are relatively high, RP may lead to lower social welfare levels and its in-
troduction may not be advised. Clearly, and from a broader perspective, our results indicate that
the introduction of RP is not necessarily always beneficial and thus does not constitute a model
towards which all reimbursement mechanisms should converge.
This paper has the following structure: section 2 describes the base model; section 3 contains
our main results and section 4 looks at their welfare implications; finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Our model is loosely inspired by Rath and Zhao (2001), who combine horizontal differentiation, a
la Hotelling, with elastic demand for each consumer.
Consumers are assumed to buy a Hicksian composite good (denoted by h) and a differentiated
pharmaceutical (denoted by d). This differentiated product exists in two varieties: branded (in
which case d = b) and generic (in which case d = g). We use the terms ‘incumbent’and ‘entrant’to
refer to the producers of the branded and generic varieties of the differentiated product, respectively.
These two firms compete by simultaneously setting prices.
The consumer’s utility from consuming qh units of the Hicksian good and qd units of the dif-
ferentiated good is u (qh, qd) = qh − 1/qd − fd, where fd is a disutility parameter discussed in more
detail below.3 In this utility function, increased consumption of the differentiated product reduces
a negative element that can be interpreted as ‘disease’or ‘discomfort’. The marginal utility asso-
ciated with consuming the differentiated product is decreasing, i.e. increasing consumption levels
contribute gradually less towards the treatment of the underlying health condition.
The consumer’s budget constraint is given by phqh + pdqd = m, where m represents the con-
sumer’s income. When we normalize ph = 1, the demand functions that result from utility maxi-
mization subject to the budget constraint are given by:
3Several utility functions could be used to represent a consumer’s utility in the consumption of these two goods;
for instance, Rath and Zhao (2001) assume a utility function which gives rise to linear demand functions. However,
many such functions (including that of Rath and Zhao, 2001) make the model untractable and equilibrium prices
cannot be explicitly obtained. The exact specification of the utility function (and its implicit demand functions) may
not be critical to our results, as we discuss in Section 5.
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Note, in particular, that demand for the differentiated product is isoelastic and the (absolute
value of) demand elasticity is equal to 1/2.
We assume that consumers differ in the degree to which they distrust the generic pharmaceutical
to be therapeutically equivalent to the branded product. This seems plausible not only among the
general public but among trained physicians as well. Kesselheim et al. (2008, p. 2514) note that
“...generic drugs are chemically equivalent to their brand-name counterparts in terms of active
ingredients but may differ in peripheral features, such as pill color or shape, inert binders and
fillers, and the specific manufacturing process”. However, “...[s]ome physicians and patients have
expressed concern that bioequivalent generic and brand-name drugs may not be equivalent in their
effects on various clinical parameters, including physiological measures such as heart rate or blood
pressure, important laboratory measurements, and outcomes such as health system utilization or
mortality” (Kesselheim et al., 2008, p. 2515). The scientific debate on whether bioequivalence
translates onto treatment effect equivalence is still ongoing, but at the very least suggests that it is
plausible and possibly rational for a consumer to “suspect”that a generic drug may not have the
same treatment effect as the branded drug.4 ,5
The parameter fd in the utility function measures the utility loss the consumer suffers by
buying a drug he trusts less than the branded product. By definition, fb = 0, as the branded
product is the benchmark against which trust is measured. As for consumers that buy the generic,
we assume fg (c) = tc. The parameter c ∈ [0, 1] measures the "level of distrust". The parameter
t > 0 measures the negative impact of this distrust on the consumer’s utility. We assume c to be
uniformly distributed in the [0, 1] interval.
Our model can be interpreted in two ways. As an analogy with previous models in the RP
literature, it is possible to describe the [0, 1] interval as a Hotelling line. In this interpretation, the
entrant is located at the left end of the interval and uses mill pricing: consumers bear transportation
costs. The incumbent, however, uses delivered pricing, making its location not directly relevant to
4Kesselheim et al. (2008) conclude, in their meta-analysis of various studies, that generics and branded drugs
have similar clinical outcomes in the treatment of cardiovascular diseases; by contrast, Borgherini (2003) reaches an
opposite conclusion - that bioequivalence and therapeutic effectiveness are not necessarily the same - for psychoactive
drugs; in line with those findings, Meredith (2003) suggests that average measures of bioequivalence are not necessarily
suffi cient to ensure treatment effect equivalence for some drugs and notes that “...measures of bioequivalence that
take into account variability among subjects and between healthy populations and patient populations may be more
appropriate”(p. 2887).
5Kobayashi et al. (2011) discusses evidence from various countries (United States, Spain, Portugal, Germany and
Norway) where consumers were (or are) skeptic on the effectiveness and safety of generic drugs. In a study on the
underlying reasons for generic underuse in Portugal, Quintal and Mendes (2011) find that over 40% of respondents
justify it due to their “lack of trust” in generics.
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the determination of the equilibrium prices. It is more intuitive, however, to interpret the model
as one of vertical differentiation: in this interpretation, the [0, 1] interval is a scale that measures
the subjective perceived vertical differentiation between branded pharmaceutical and generic. A
consumer with c = 0 shows "no distrust", i.e. believes the generic to be fully equivalent to the
branded pharmaceutical. On the other hand, c = 1 implies that the consumer has the maximum
level of distrust conceivable for a drug that has gone through the licensing process. Thus, if branded
and generic prices’were equal, only the consumer with c = 0 would be indifferent between the two;
all others would strictly prefer the branded drug. However, if the generic is cheaper than the branded
drug, consumers face a trade-off between their disutility in generic consumption (associated with
their distrust of generics) and the higher utility in consumption they can obtain because of lower
generic prices.
Further note that we assume this disutility to be independent of the quantity consumed (i.e.
lump sum). Stahl (1987), Anderson et al. (1992) and Rath and Zhao (2001) justify this assumption
by noting that in standard Hotelling models, where this disutility is a transportation cost associ-
ated with the distance between the consumer and the producer’s geographical location, the act of
consumption requires a shopping trip, whose cost is largely invariant to the quantity consumed and
which translates into economies of scale. In a similar vein, we can regard the disutility associated
with purchasing the generic variety as a (fixed) consumer-specific distrust in its treatment effec-
tiveness, which does not depend on the quantity he decides to consume of that drug. Assuming a
fixed disutility in the consumption of a generic is equivalent to a decreasing average disutility per
unit consumed (somewhat equivalent to the economies of scale mentioned above).6
In this context, consumer c ∈ [0, 1] obtains the following utility from consuming the branded
product: ub (qh, qb) = qh− 1/qb− fb = qh− 1/qb, because we assume fb = 0. Similarly, the utility of
consuming the generic product is ug (qh, qg) = qh−1/qg−fg (c) = qh−1/qg− tc, because we assume
fg (c) = tc. The choice of which variety of the differentiated product (branded or generic) to buy
is endogenous: consumers for which ub ≥ ug prefer the branded pharmaceutical, whilst all others
choose instead to consume the generic. The quantities consumed are given by the demand functions
above. Note that the model implicitly assumes that each consumer purchases branded or generic
pharmaceuticals, but not both simultaneously: consumers compare the maximum utility they can
obtain (given their budget constraint) by consuming (a certain quantity of) each pharmaceutical
variety - branded or generic - and choose whichever yields the highest utility.
6As an alternative, we could have assumed a constant per unit disutility, i.e. fg (c) = tcqg. This would be a
sensible assumption if each consumer’s distrust in the generic treatment is likely to be proportional to the quantity
consumed, thus implying that, all else equal, consumers would be less confident in the generic’s treatment effectiveness
the more they consumed it. Note that empirical studies, such as that of Quintal and Mendes (2011), point to an
increased probability of consumers’acceptance of generic substitution if they have consumed generics before, thus
lending some support to our not using this alternative assumption. Nevertheless, when solving the model under this
assumption, the results become computationally untractable and no closed form solutions can be found. However,
some simulations indicate that the results of Proposition 1 and 2 would hold, but that those of Proposition 3 would
not: under this alternative assumption, RP would always lead to higher social welfare levels than FPR.
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Both the choice between the generic and branded product as well as the quantities consumed
depend on the prices charged to the consumer and these depend on the existence and properties of
the reimbursement mechanism. We analyze two reimbursement schemes: a fixed percentage reim-
bursement (FPR) mechanism (henceforth represented by the superscript ‘F’), in which consumers
pay the same percentage (copayment rate), θ ∈ [0, 1], of their desired product’s headline price (the
headline price being the price set by the producer); and a reference pricing (RP) mechanism (hence-
forth represented by the superscript ‘R’), where the consumer’s copayment is based on the price
of the ‘reference’pharmaceutical - typically the generic because it is cheaper and hence leads to a
lower reimbursement expenditure by the third-party payer. Under a RP mechanism, the consumer
must pay a percentage (copayment rate) of the reference pharmaceutical’s price if he chooses to
purchase it, but if he chooses to purchase other pharmaceuticals in a predetermined reference group
he must also pay the full price difference between that pharmaceutical’s price and the reference
price. In order to highlight the differences between these two reimbursement mechanisms, under a




k − (1− θ) pFk = θpFk , k = b, g (2)
We define pFk (k = b, g) to be the headline prices set by firms when the FPR mechanism is
in place. By contrast, under a reference pricing mechanism, the effective prices are given by (we




b − (1− θ) pRg
p̂Rg = p
R
g − (1− θ) pRg = θpRg (3)
where pRk (k = b, g) are the headline prices set by firms when the RP mechanism is in place.
We will also refer to the no reimbursement (NR) scenario, whereby patients must support the
headline prices in full; this is equivalent to setting θ = 1 in equation (2) or (3). Finally, production
costs are assumed to be zero and the total number of consumers is set equal to 1, i.e. product
quantities can be interpreted as market shares.
3 Pricing
3.1 Fixed Percentage Reimbursement
Under a fixed percentage reimbursement mechanism, where the effective prices for the branded






g respectively, the “marginal consumer”, c
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b.g, who
is indifferent between buying the branded (b) or generic (g) pharmaceuticals is found by solving
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As the total number of consumers is assumed to be equal to one, cFb.g gives us the market
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the incumbent and entrant respectively. Maximizing these functions with respect to pFb and p
F
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At the equilibrium prices, cFb.g = 1/3, which implies that whilst each individual consumer pur-
chases more units of the generic drug than of the branded drug, the latter is sold to a larger number
of consumers. These two effects cancel each other out and in equilibrium each producer sells exactly
the same quantity: 2/t units.








When no reimbursement (NR) mechanism exists, θ = 1 and we obtain results which are in line





k , with k = b, g. Under a fixed percentage reimbursement scheme, firms mark-up their
headline prices in an inversely proportional manner relative to the copayment rate: the higher is the
copayment rate, the lower is that mark-up under a FPR mechanism. This implies that the effective
price paid by consumers is equal in both cases and therefore equilibrium quantities are also the same,
i.e. p̂Fk = p̂
NR
k (k = b, g), B




j , j = b, g,
i.e. firms also increase their profits in an inversely proportional manner relative to the copayment
rate. Headline prices, pb and pg, are lowest when the patient’s copayment rate is maximal, i.e.
when θ = 1.
Consumer surplus (CS) is given by the sum of the surplus of buying the branded and generic


















Note that CS does not depend on θ : as outlined above, the existence of a copayment rate has
no impact on the effective prices consumers must face, p̂b and p̂g. Hence, the existence of a FPR
mechanism (through parameter θ) does not affect consumer surplus, i.e. CSF = CSNR.
Total profits, which are equivalent to total pharmaceutical expenditure, are given by:






Government (or other third-party payers) expenditure with pharmaceuticals is a proportion
(1− θ) of total pharmaceutical expenditure:
GF = (1− θ) ΠF = (1− θ) 5t
18θ
(14)
Note that government expenditure is decreasing with θ. This result has two causes: (i) first,
there is the direct effect that as θ increases, the reimbursement rate (1− θ) , applicable to total
pharmaceutical expenditure, decreases; on the other hand, there is the strategic effect that pro-
ducers respond to higher copayment rates by reducing headline prices, thus bringing down total
pharmaceutical expenditure.
3.2 Reference Pricing
Under a reference pricing mechanism, the effective prices for the branded and generic drugs are
p̂Rb = p
R
b − (1− θ) pRg and p̂Rg = θpRg respectively (see equation (3)) and the “marginal consumer”,
cRb.g, who is indifferent between buying the branded (b) or generic (g) pharmaceuticals is again found










pRb − (1− θ) pRg
]1/2 − 2θ1/2 (pRg )1/2
t
(15)
Similarly to the FPR case, cRb.g gives us the market share of the entrant (which produces the
























represent the price vector.































. When we maximize the latter profit function with respect to pRg , the









pRb − (1− θ) pRg
)1/2
= 0 (16)
This non-linear equation has two solutions, one of which results in pRb < p
R
g whenever θ > 1/4.
This violates the assumption that the generic drug is the reference pharmaceutical because it is
10












/∂pRb = 0) results in the following first-order condition:
tpRb − 2t (1− θ) pRg − 4
[





)1/2 − 4θ1/2 (1− θ) (pRg )3/2
2t
[
pRb − (1− θ) pRg
]3/2 = 0 (18)
Substituting the entrant’s best-response function (equation (17)) into this equation, we obtain
the incumbent’s Nash equilibrium price and subsequently substituting it into equation (17), we also














































≤ 1/3, ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] (in particular, cRb.g is an
increasing function of θ) which implies that, as under the FPR mechanism, whilst each individual
consumer purchases more units of the generic drug than of the branded drug, the latter is sold to a
larger number of consumers. However, also as under the FPR mechanism, these two effects cancel





It is particularly relevant to highlight the following (novel) result:
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) are increasing in θ.
Proof. In equilibrium, under a RP mechanism, headline prices are given by equation (19),




















Both derivatives are positive for any t > 0 and θ ∈ [0, 1] . Effective equilibrium prices are





































Again, both derivatives are positive for any t > 0 and θ ∈ [0, 1] .
When we compare these equilibrium prices with those obtained under a FPR mechanism, we
also obtain the following result:













) are never higher than under a FPR mechanism.
Proof. Recall that headline equilibrium prices under a FPR mechanism are those given by
equation (8), whilst under a RP mechanism they are given by equation (19). Using those expres-
sions, it is straightforward to show that pFb > p
R
b for any θ ∈ [0, 1) and pFb = pRb when θ = 1.
Similarly, pFg > p
R
g for any θ ∈ [0, 1) and pFg = pRg when θ = 1.
Effective equilibrium prices under FPR are easily calculated using equations (2) and (8): p̂Fb =
4t2/9 and p̂Fg = t
2/9. Effective equilibrium prices under RP are given above (see proof of Proposition
1). It is now straightforward to show that p̂Fb > p̂
R
b for any θ ∈ [0, 1) and p̂Fb = p̂Rb when θ = 1.
Similarly, p̂Fg > p̂
R
g for any θ ∈ [0, 1) and p̂Fg = p̂Rg when θ = 1.
In order to understand the rationale underlying these two results, Figure 1 contains a graph-
ical representation of equilibrium headline (left) and effective prices (right) under the FPR and
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RP mechanisms, assuming t = 0.5.7 First, note that headline prices under a FPR mechanism are
decreasing with θ whilst under a RP mechanism they are increasing (Proposition 1). Under a FPR
mechanism, an increase in the copayment rate (θ) would lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in
effective prices, therefore reducing the quantity consumed of both the branded and generic phar-
maceuticals. In this context, both firms find it profit-maximizing to reduce headline prices and,
thus, to reduce the (negative) impact on demand. It turns out that, in equilibrium, this reduction
is suffi cient for effective prices not to change and, thus, for individually consumed quantities and
overall sold quantities of both goods to remain constant. Inevitably, this hurts both firms’profits.
As mentioned earlier, this result is similar to that of Brekke et at. (2007). An increase in the
copayment rate leads to a reduction in total pharmaceutical expenditure (which is equal to prof-
its) and, consequently, to a reduction in government expenditure, but consumer surplus remains
unchanged. From a different point of view, reimbursement through a FPR mechanism can be seen
as a public subsidy received by firms; as the copayment rate increases (i.e. as the reimbursement
rate decreases), this public subsidy decreases (and becomes equal to zero when θ = 1).
Under a RP mechanism, an increase in θ (ceteris paribus) would lead to an increase in effective
prices by the same amount. However, because it is lower, the effective price of the generic would
increase by more than the effective price of the branded pharmaceutical in percentage terms. In
comparative terms, the branded product would become relatively less expensive, thus attracting
some of the consumers that were previously buying the generic. In this context, the incumbent
finds it profit-maximizing to respond to the increase in the copayment rate with an increase in its
headline price. As prices are strategic complements, the entrant does the same. In equilibrium, the
increase in the copayment rate coupled with the increase in headline prices unequivocally increases
effective prices and reduces individually consumed quantities as well as overall demand for both
pharmaceuticals.
Note that, as shown in Proposition 2, headline and effective prices are higher under a FPR
mechanism (except for θ = 1, in which case they are equal). This suggests that RP is more
effective in bringing about price competition than FPR, to the benefit of consumers. This result is
in line with that of the existing literature (Brekke et al., 2007; Merino-Castelló, 2003).















7Note that the result in Proposition 2 does not depend on the value of t. This assumption is made here merely



















Figure 1: Headline (left) and effective (right) equilibrium prices under FPR and RP (assuming
t = 0.5)
Corollary 1 The incumbent’s profits are always increasing with θ, whilst the entrant’s profits are
only increasing with θ when θ < 1/4.










3 ; this is positive only when θ < 1/4.
As argued above, an increase in θ works to the incumbent’s advantage, as it allows it to raise
headline prices and profits. By contrast, the entrant’s profits are only increasing with θ when the
copayment rate is relatively low (θ < 1/4); above that threshold, the entrant’s profits are decreasing
with θ, as it finds the net effect of higher headline and effective prices and lower demand to be
negative.
Consumer surplus (CS) is given by the sum of the surplus of buying the branded and generic






























Note that consumer surplus under a RP mechanism is decreasing with θ. This is to be expected
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because effective prices are increasing with θ (Proposition 1). Total profits, which are equivalent
to total pharmaceutical expenditure, are given by:











Thus, overall profits are an increasing function of θ: as θ increases, the increase in profits of the
incumbent is suffi cient to offset any reduction in profits by the entrant. Government (or other third-
party payers) expenditure with pharmaceuticals is a proportion (1− θ) of total pharmaceutical
expenditure:









Corollary 2 Below a certain threshold (θ′ ' 0.14), government expenditure is increasing with θ.
Proof. Note that ∂GR/∂θ =
t(3−2θ1/2−9θ−14θ3/2−8θ2)
4θ1/2(1+2θ1/2)
3 . This derivative is positive whenever θ is
below the threshold θ′ ' 0.14.
For low values of θ, government expenditure is increasing with θ: producers respond to higher
copayment rates by increasing prices but, at these low levels of copayment, this has little impact
on demand; resulting price rises lead to a higher pharmaceutical expenditure which implies higher
reimbursements. Above a certain threshold (θ′ ' 0.14), this no longer is the case: the reduced
reimbursement rate applied to higher headline prices and lower total demand decreases government
expenditure.
4 Welfare analysis
We now turn our attention to the welfare implications of our results. We first focus on social
welfare (SW) - the sum of consumer and producer surplus minus government expenditure with
pharmaceuticals - and show that:
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold value (θ̃ = 2/3) below which social welfare is higher under
a RP mechanism and above which social welfare is higher (or equal) under a FPR mechanism.
Proof. Under a FPR mechanism, social welfare is given by SWF = CSF + ΠF − GF . Using
the expressions in equations (12), (13) and (14) we obtain:




By contrast, under a RP mechanism, social welfare is given by SWR = CSR + ΠR−GR. Using
the expressions in equations (25), (26) and (27) we obtain:
SWR = m−
(







The difference between social welfare under the two reimbursement mechanisms is given by:
SWF − SWR =
(







The denominator is always positive and t is also assumed to be strictly positive. Therefore,
the sign of this expression depends on the numerator, which is a concave non-linear function. It
has two roots: θ̃ = 2/3 and θ = 1. Therefore, when 0 ≤ θ < θ̃ = 2/3, we have SWF − SWR < 0;
by contrast, when 1 ≥ θ > θ̃ = 2/3, we have SWF − SWR ≥ 0 (above the threshold θ̃ = 2/3,
SWF − SWR > 0 for all values of θ strictly below 1 and SWF − SWR = 0 when θ = 1, as this is
the second root of the non-linear function).
Brekke et al. (2007) suggest a different welfare measure which may be more relevant to countries
which do not have a significant pharmaceutical industry. In those cases, it is unlikely that profits
would enter the welfare function. Thus, welfare (W ) can be more narrowly defined in a public payer
perspective, only taking into account consumer surplus net of government expenditure. Following
this approach, we can state that:
Proposition 4 From a public payer’s welfare perspective, RP is never worse than FPR, i.e. WR ≥
WF , ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] .
Proof. Using the expressions in equations (12) and (14), welfare in a public payer’s perspective
under the FPR mechanism is given by:





whilst under a RP mechanism it is given by (see equations (25) and (27)):
WR = CSR −GR = m+
(







The difference in welfare under the two reimbursement mechanisms is given by:
WF −WR =
(








The denominator is always positive and t is also assumed to be strictly positive. Therefore, the
sign of this expression depends on the sign of the concave non-linear function in the numerator,
which is negative for ∀θ ∈ [0, 1) (in which case WF < WR) and equal to zero when θ = 1 (in which
case WF = WR).
Figures 2 contains a graphical representation of consumer surplus, profits net of government
expenditure, social welfare and welfare from a public payer’s perspective under both reimbursement
regimes, assuming t = 0.5 and m = 1.8 First, note that social welfare under a FPR mechanism does
not depend on θ; this result is similar to Brekke et al. (2007) (Proposition 6). As argued earlier,
under a FPR mechanism, pharmaceutical firms effectively receive a public subsidy but consumers
do not benefit from lower (effective) prices: the mark-up of headline prices (proportional to the
reimbursement rate) is fully borne by the government and hence this transfer (effectively a public
subsidy) is neutral from a social welfare perspective. From a policy viewpoint, this result clearly
indicates the need for pharmaceutical price regulation prior to inclusion in a FPR mechanism.
By contrast, under reference pricing, social welfare depends on θ : as it increases, headline
and effective prices also increase, thus reducing consumer surplus, increasing profits and (above a
certain threshold) reducing government expenditure. The net effect of θ on social welfare depends
on the relative contributions of these offsetting effects: the negative effect on consumer surplus
and the positive effect on profits and government expenditure.9 For a large range of values for θ
(θ ∈ [0, 0.82) , with the upper bound being an approximate value), the negative effects dominates
and thus social welfare is decreasing with θ, whilst for higher values of θ social welfare is increasing
with θ.
Combining these two results leads to the conclusion (Proposition 3) that a threshold exists
below which RP yields a higher social welfare but above which it is FPR which yields a higher
social welfare. This is not totally surprising: as θ increases, consumer surplus under RP decreases
and approaches that of FPR (which is constant); by contrast, profits net of government expenditure
increase and approach those of FPR (see Figure 2). Above that threshold, the (marginally negative)
contribution that profits net of government expenditure make towards social welfare under RP
(relative to FPR) becomes more significant than the (marginally positive) contribution of consumer
surplus.
When profits are not considered in the welfare measure - as in Proposition 4 - then only consumer
surplus and government expenditure should be considered. Under a RP mechanism, consumer
surplus is decreasing with θ but always larger than (or equal to, when θ = 1) under FPR; government
expenditure is always decreasing with θ under FPR and almost always (above θ ' 0.14) decreasing
8Again, note that the results in Propositions 3 and 4 do not depend on the value of t and m. This assumption is
made here merely with the objective of obtaining a graphical representation of the results and understanding their
rationale.
9Note that, taken together, the sum of profits net of government expenditure is an increasing function of θ, as we



































Figure 2: Consumer surplus and profits net of government expenditure (left), social welfare (middle)
and welfare from a public payer’s perspective (right) under FPR and RP (assuming t=0.5 and m=1)
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with θ under RP, but under RP always lower than (or equal to, when θ = 1) under FPR. Therefore,
from a public payer’s perspective, RP unequivocally leads to higher welfare levels than FPR, and
this is particularly so the lower is the copayment rate (or the higher is the reimbursement rate) -
when consumer surplus under RP is highest (relative to FPR) and when government expenditure
under FPR is also highest (relative to RP).
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper studies the competitive properties of two commonly adopted reimbursement mecha-
nisms, fixed percentage reimbursement (FPR) and reference pricing (RP), in a setting in which
consumers’individual demand is price-elastic. Contrary to previous literature, we show that RP
may be worse than FPR, from a social welfare viewpoint, for suffi ciently high copayment rates.
This is because, in such a setting, RP has the counterintuitive property that higher copayment rates
lead to higher prices. Policy-wise, our results throw some caution in the prevailing idea that intro-
ducing RP is likely to generate substantial benefits to consumers (in the form of lower prices) and
will necessarily lead to higher social welfare levels. Thus, whereas we show that RP does have some
advantages compared to FPR, it is unlikely to be an ‘always better’reimbursement mechanism.
An important question is whether our results would hold for demand functions different from
the very specific one we consider. The main driver of our results is the fact that, under RP, an
increase in θ leads to a higher percentage increase in the effective price of the generic and, thus,
to a change in relative prices in favor of the branded pharmaceutical. This tips market shares in
favor of the more expensive product. The key question, then, is whether this is suffi cient to offset
the direct negative impact on demand for that product that results from the higher copayment
rate, creating the incentive for a price increase. Whilst we have not explicitly solved the model
under alternative setups, it appears plausible that, for a large family of demand functions, it will.
Exploring the conditions in which this happens is a possible avenue for future research.
Clearly, this paper’s results on pricing are amenable to empirical testing, as that which was
carried out by Brekke et al. (2009) and Brekke et al. (2011). It is particularly relevant to highlight
that our predictions only differ from those of Brekke et al. (2009) and Brekke et al. (2011) in what
RP is concerned. In addition, it may be worthwhile to extend the analysis to a third possible, and
to the best of our knowledge yet under-researched, reimbursement mechanism: asymmetric fixed
percentage reimbursement, through which the reimbursement rates are different for different types
of pharmaceuticals, with generics typically attracting higher reimbursement (lower copayment)
rates. This type of mechanism has been used, for instance, in Portugal in order to help increase
generic penetration at an early development stage. Whilst this type of mechanism introduces more
complexity in the analysis, it may also have the merit to uncover more intricate details of firms’
pricing incentives. These are also possible next steps in our research.
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